Signal
In November 2025, researchers from Zhejiang University and Beijing Institute of Technology published a simulation study showing that a large swarm of jamming drones could, theoretically, block Starlink service across an area the size of Taiwan. The study estimates that between 935 and 2,000 high-altitude drones or balloons, spaced several kilometres apart and flying at about 20 km altitude, broadcasting jamming signals could create an “electromagnetic shield” sufficient to deny Starlink communications across the island. The simulation used real satellite orbital data over a 12‑hour period and modelled both broadband and narrowband interference, accounting for the dynamic mesh nature of Starlink’s constellation.
Why it matters
Starlink has emerged as a critical resilience tool for forces with disrupted terrestrial infrastructure, from Ukraine to potential flashpoints in East Asia. The idea that its network could be neutralised by an airborne swarm shifts the threat horizon. If implemented, such a jamming framework would challenge the notion that LEO satellite internet is conflict‑proof. For Taiwan and other frontline states, the risk is not just kinetic, but electromagnetic. The viability of satellite‑based comms as strategic redundancy now depends on countermeasures, not just launchers.
Strategic Takeaway
Satellite networks are powerful but not invulnerable. In a future high‑intensity conflict, control of the skies and spectrum may matter as much as control of islands or sea lanes. High‑altitude swarms turn communication dominance into contested terrain.
Investor Implications
Expect demand to surge for counter‑jam hardware, anti‑drone air‑defence systems, resilient satellite terminal design, and secure alternative comms infrastructure (e.g. fibre‑backed undersea cables, hardened GNSS alternatives). Firms working on electromagnetic resilience, signal‑hopping modulation, and drone‑detection systems may become strategic plays. Providers of satellite comms may need to invest in jamming detection, adaptive frequency hopping, or backup RF/optical links.
Watchpoints
2026 → Publication of full peer‑reviewed simulation dataset in Systems Engineering & Electronics — check for methodological critique or follow‑up studies.
2026–27 → Possible deployment of high-altitude drones or balloons by PLA around Taiwan — monitor increased air‑domain activity or satellite‑shield claims from Beijing.
2026 → Starlink and other LEO providers’ response: upgrades to anti‑jamming hardware or terminal firmware; monitor patent filings or new frequency‑hopping protocols.
Tactical Lexicon: Jamming Swarm
A coordinated group of airborne platforms (drones, balloons, UAVs) broadcasting electromagnetic interference to block satellite or radio communications over a wide area.
Why it matters:
Transforms a sprawling satellite network from a protected backbone into a contested target.
Adds a dimension of air‑domain denial to traditional maritime or ground‑based suppression.
Sources: taipeitimes.com
The signal is the high ground. Hold it.
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